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Dear Madam Rector, dear Mr Dean, dear colleagues, dear friends, dear Paul, cara 
mamma, 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In December 2008, a bit more than 10 years ago, I stood in this very same spot to 
defend my PhD thesis entitled “Europeanisation of Administrative Justice? The 
Influence of the European Court of Justice’s case law in Italy, Germany and England”.1 
On that day, as all PhD candidates at this University, I was allowed to start the defense 
of my PhD thesis with a 15-minute presentation on my research project and its main 
results. Back then, I stood here and opened my speech with this slide, and told the 
story of an Italian applicant, Mariolina, who, in case her academic career would fail, 
was planning on opening an Italian restaurant in Maastricht, serving the gastronomical 
and enological specialties from her Region, Abruzzo. I suppose being here today 
shows that, somehow, my academic career did not fail, and I did not need to resort to 
my plan B. However, while standing here today, delivering my inaugural lecture as 
Professor of European and Comparative Administrative Law and Procedure, I am 
again talking about wine. I suppose you can say that what the EU defines as “the 
product obtained exclusively from the total or partial alcoholic fermentation of fresh 
grapes, whether or not crushed, or of grape must”2 might well be considered the 
leitmotiv or red line of my academic career. 
 
On the day in which I defended my PhD thesis, I took the denial of the Dutch authorities 
to grant me an authorization to offer delicious wines from Abruzzo as an example of a 
possible situation in which an individual would need to resort to national courts to seek 
judicial protection against the allegedly unlawful behavior of national authorities. In that 
story, I had been discriminated on grounds of nationality because the Dutch authorities 
had decided not to grant me an authorization on the ground that, according to Dutch 
law, only Dutch nationals could open bars and restaurants in the Netherlands: in such 
situations, individuals can only seek judicial protection from national courts, which are 
the main enforcers and protectors of the rights which we derive from European law.  
 
Neither my interest for wine nor that for courts has diminished with time. And so here 
I stand today to talk again about wine and courts. In fact, you could say that my interest 
for both has only grown. I suppose that, as far as wine is concerned, having met Paul, 
my French better half, contributed to me becoming more open-minded (or perhaps 
less intolerant?) towards French wine. As far as my interest for courts is concerned, I 
have continued, and I intend to continue as part of the research carried out through 
my chair, to explore the role of courts in the process of European integration. And 
again, courts – and the legal phenomena that I study - and wine are very much 
intertwined.  
                                                     
1 M. Eliantonio, Europeanisation of Administrative Justice? The Influence of the ECJ’s Case Law in Italy, 
Germany and England (Europa Law Publishing, 2008).  
2 This is the definition contained in Part II of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets 
in agricultural products [2013] OJ L 347, p. 671–854. 
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In the rest of this lecture, I will present to you three instruments of governance which 
are all linked with wine, namely shared and transnational administration, soft law, and 
standardization, and I will show how these instruments challenge the traditional role of 
courts and, thereby, possibly endanger the judicial protection of individuals against the 
actions of public authorities. What are then the “normative demands” of wine 
governance? 
 
2. Shared and transnational administration 
 
The first instrument of wine governance which I would like to present you today is the 
system of Protected Designation of Origin. The wonderful Cerasuolo d’Abruzzo wine, 
a cherry-red, intense rosé, is such an example.3 
 
The Protected Designation of Origin is a label which refers to an area, a specific place 
or, in exceptional cases, the name of a country, and which is used for agricultural 
products or foodstuffs. To receive this label, the entire product must be traditionally 
and entirely manufactured within the specific region and thus acquire unique 
properties. 
 
To register the name of a product, producers need to lay down the product’s 
specifications and link to the geographical area. The application is sent to national 
authorities for scrutiny and then, on the basis of the assessment made by the national 
authorities, it is forwarded to the European Commission, who will examine the request. 
The European Commission will then decide if the product will be protected under the 
quality scheme requested.4 
 
This is a typical example of a system called “shared administration”, that is a system 
in which national authorities and EU authorities collaborate, at different moments, with 
various intensities and with various types of activities, to the implementation of EU 
law.5 I just gave you the example of wine, but this system of collaboration, between 
national and European authorities and between national authorities themselves, exists 
in virtually all fields of EU law, ranging from competition, to fisheries, to the marketing 
authorization of medicines, the supervision of financial institutions or the regulation of 
asylum protection. 
 
                                                     
3 Registration under “PDO-IT-A0743” available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/wine/e-bacchus/updates_en.pdf  
4 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/33 of 17 October 2018 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards applications for protection of 
designations of origin, geographical indications and traditional terms in the wine sector, the objection 
procedure, restrictions of use, amendments to product specifications, cancellation of protection, and 
labelling and presentation [2019] OJ L 9, p. 2–45. 
5  See further M Eliantonio, ‘Judicial review in an integrated administration: the case of “composite 
procedures”’ (2014) 7 Review of European Administrative Law 65; H C H Hofmann, G C Rowe, A. H. 
Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (OUP 2011). 
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This system exists, in fact, since the creation of the project of European integration, 
but it has recently increased in importance, and has seen the growing involvement of 
new institutional actors, such as the European agencies or the European Central Bank.  
 
Intertwined with this phenomenon, there is another one, which is generally referred to 
as “transnational administrative law”. What does this mean? It refers to situations in 
which an act taken by the competent authorities has effects outside the territory of the 
Member State to which the authority belongs.6 Said like that, this sounds very exotic, 
but in fact many sitting in this room today hold a transnational administrative law in 
their pockets or in their bags: their driving licence, issued by one national authority, but 
enabling the holder to drive in the whole European Union. Also the system of 
transnational administrative law exists since many years, but it has increased in 
importance in the last decade. We can see examples of transnational administrative 
acts in fields as diverse as those concerning the marketing of mineral water, diploma 
recognition, the shipment of waste or the Schengen area. 
 
What is then the problem with all of this? 
 
That while the system of decision-making has become more and more shared, and 
transnational, the system of judicial protection is, in principle, still anchored to a strict 
separation of jurisdiction. Every national judge, in other words, is in principle competent 
only for the acts issued by the authorities which operate in the national territory, even 
if they were only parts of a bigger – horizontal or vertical – decision-making process. 
So a German judge is authorized to review the lawfulness of German administrative 
measure, but if this German measure is the product of a bigger decision-making 
process which originated, for example, in France or at the EU level, the German judge 
is in principle not competent to look at the French or EU parts of the decision-making 
process, for which the French and EU judges respectively remain competent. 
 
And what is the problem with this, you may be asking. That, because of this strict 
separation of jurisdiction, some acts may fall “in the cracks of the system” and not be 
able to be judicially reviewed.7 Concretely this means means that it might very difficult 
or even impossible for citizens, companies or other actors to challenge the actions of 
the EU or national authorities, like the registration or denial of registration of a product 
with a protected designation of origin. This denial of justice would be problematic from 
the perspective of compliance with the rule of law,8 and with the principle of effective 
                                                     
6 See further M. Ruffert, ‘The transnational Administrative Act’, in O.J. Jansen, B. Schöndorf-Haubold 
(Eds) The European Composite Administration (Intersentia, 2011), 277 ff; M. Gautier, ‘Acte administratif 
transnational et droit communautaire’, in J.-B.Auby, J. Dutheil de la Rochère (Eds) Droit Administratif 
Européen (Bruylant, 2014) 1303 ff; J.J. Pernas García, ‘The EU’s Role in the Progress Towards the 
Recognition and Execution of Foreign Administrative Acts: The Principle of Mutual Recognition and the 
Transnational Nature of Certain Administrative Acts’, in J. Rodrigo-Arana Muñoz (Ed) Recognition of 
Foreign Administrative Acts (Springer, 2016), 15-31; L. De Lucia, Amministrazione transnazionale e 
ordinamento europeo (Giappichelli, 2009). 
7 See the Introduction to the ReNEUAL Model Rules; Book I – General Provisions; para. 27, where the 
phrase “black hole” is used. 
8 See Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para 23, 
where the Court of Justice spoke of a “Community based on the rule of law”. 
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judicial protection enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.9  
 
In a number of cases,10 the Court of Justice has held that, if a national preparatory 
measure, such as the opinion of a national competent authority, is decisive for the 
outcome of a decision-making process which is concluded at EU level, national courts 
should be able to review these acts of the national authorities which are only 
intermediate or preparatory in the decision-making process, notwithstanding what 
national procedural rules would require. A more recent case, one of the many, I am 
afraid, which has involved the former Italian Prime Minister, Mr Berlusconi, added to 
the earlier case law that, when instead the final EU measure is not pre-determined by 
the national preparatory measure, the Court of Justice is competent to review the 
entirety of the decision-making process, including its national part.11 
 
The first question, and one which has not yet been explored, is whether national courts 
have indeed followed the approach of the Court of Justice. While a number of authors 
have explored the question of the division of competences between national and 
European courts in the case of shared administration,12 more comparative research 
should be carried out as to how national courts have considered the issue of 
reviewability of intermediate and preparatory measures in the system of shared 
administration. 
 
Secondly, what these cases tackle is the question of division of jurisdiction between 
national courts and European courts. But can we apply these conclusions to the 
horizontal delimitation of jurisdiction between national courts? Here the issue of shared 
administration is intertwined with that of transnational administrative law and the 
growing situations of horizontal sharing of information between Member States 
authorities. Take an alert issued in the context of the Schengen Information System.13 
In this case, one national authority enters a piece of information concerning an 
individual in a database and another authority of another Member State can take a 
decision concerning that individual (for example a decision of expulsion from the 
national territory), on the basis of that piece of information. 
 
In a series of cases, the French Conseil d’État has reviewed the lawfulness of a 
German Schengen alert taken on the basis of the applicable EU legislation. 14 
                                                     
9 Article 47. 
10 Most notably in Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli v Commission EU:C:1992:491. 
11  Case C-219/17 Silvio Berlusconi and Fininvest v Banca d’Italia and IVASS [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1023. 
12 Eg F. Brito Bastos, ‘The Borelli Doctrine Revisited: Three Issues of Coherence in a Landmark Ruling 
for EU Administrative Justice’ (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative Law 269; F. Brito Bastos, 
‛Derivative Illegality in European Composite Administrative Procedures’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law 
Review 101; S. Alonso de León, Composite Administrative Procedures in the European Union 
(Iustel/UCLM 2017) 251-318; J. Fernández Gaztea, ‘A Jurisdiction of Jurisdictions’ (2019) 12 Review of 
European Administrative Law 9. 
13 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 
on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
[2006] OJ L 381, p. 4–23. 
14 Conseil d’Etat, Forabosco, Judgment of 9 June 1999, No. 190384. 
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However, no comparative and coherent research has been carried out on the attitudes 
of national courts on the review of foreign national administrative measures.15 
 
Furthermore, the horizontal system of information sharing, and in general, the question 
of transnational administrative acts raise a number of additional questions: what are 
the consequences of a national courts ruling on the unlawfulness of a foreign 
administrative act? To which extent should the principle of res judicata apply in such 
situations? How to avoid the duplication of procedures leading to possibly contradictory 
judgments in several Member States? These are all relevant and unexplored questions 
which I hope to research with, amongst others, the colleagues which are part of the 
“Transnational Administrative Law Network”. 
 
What are then the “normative demands” of shared and transnational administration? 
That no action falls in “the cracks of the system”, and, thereby, both at national and 
European level, that “effective judicial protection” is ensured, as required by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. How and to what extent this is currently ensured is 
certainly a matter for further investigation. 
 
3. Soft law 
 
The second instrument of wine governance which I would like to present to you today 
is the European Food Safety Authority Guidance on the establishment of the residue 
definition for dietary risk assessment. This document guides the complex process of 
identifying the residue components that should be considered for dietary risk 
assessments of chemical active substances in, amongst others, wine – of course.16  
 
This document is an example of what is usually referred to as “soft law”, namely 
measures which come in various shapes and forms – they may be called 
recommendation, guidance document, working document, guideline or something else 
– but they have all in common the feature that they are not legally binding. The use of 
soft law in European law dates back to 1962, when the European Commission issued 
the “Christmas notices”,17 pieces of soft law in the field of competition law, and today 
is present in virtually all policy fields, ranging from citizenship, to energy, food safety, 
the protection of endangered species, the supervision of credit institutions and the fight 
against social exclusion. Soft law is also more and more often inextricably linked to 
hard law. It serves to set the course of action of EU and national institutions alike, 
thereby avoiding arbitrary behavior, and to interpret hard law provisions in a legislative 
context of interestingly technical and technological nature. 
 
                                                     
15 See only for a general perspective J. Rodrigo-Arana Muñoz (Ed) Recognition of Foreign Administrative 
Acts, (Springer, 2016). 
16 https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.2903/j.efsa.2016.4549  
17 Commission, Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents [1962] OJ 139/2921; 
Commission, Notice on patent licensing agreements [1962] OJ 139/2922. 
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In the words of Advocate General Bobek, soft law measures contain “a type 
of imperfect norm: on the one hand, they clearly have the normative ambition of 
inducing compliance on the part of their addressees. On the other hand, no 
instruments of direct coercion are attached to them”.18 What should we understand 
with the phrase “normative ambition of inducing compliance”? 
 
As held by Professor Linda Senden, and repeated in countless studies after her, soft 
law “may have certain (indirect) legal effects” and “may produce practical effects”.19 
The word “may” with references to the possible legal and practical effects of soft law, 
and its uncertain connotation, is key to the discussion concerning soft law. Even the 
Court of Justice displays a rather unclear view of the “bindingness” of soft law in its 
preliminary references, by imposing duties on national courts to take EU soft law into 
consideration,20 while noting at the same time that such instruments cannot be binding 
at the national level.21 
 
Do national authorities and courts apply soft law? What effects do they give to it? Do 
national courts accept to judicially review soft law despite the fact that it is formally not 
binding? The Soft Law Research Network,22 and the many great colleagues who are 
part of it, have started to research this topic, and have discovered that the attitudes of 
national courts and authorities towards soft law varies greatly. These differences might 
be due to different institutional cultures, different relationships with national soft law, 
but also more dogmatically to the very idea of what “law” is and what the hierarchy of 
sources in a legal system is or ought to be. However, research on this topic is lacking, 
and the Soft Law Research Network is one of the first types of endeavors of this kind.23 
Much more research is needed to understand how national courts apply EU law and 
soft law in particular. The application of EU law on the ground is, indeed, an 
unchartered territory for many perspectives. 
 
The beauty and at the same time the challenge of these kinds of research projects is 
well known to all those who embark upon comparative law research. Language 
barriers, understanding the differences in national systems but also national legal 
cultures, the availability of primary sources are all difficulties which many of the 
colleagues in this room have grappled with at one point or the other in their career. 
This kind of research needs to be, in my view, networked-research with like-minded 
colleagues. The Soft Law Research Network has laid the foundations for further – 
                                                     
18 C-16/16 P, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 12 December 2017, Kingdom of Belgium 
v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2017:959, para. 86. 
19 L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing 2004). 
20 Case 322/88, Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, ECLI:EU:C:1989:646, para 18. 
21 Case C-526/14, Kotnik and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:570, para 45. 
22 https://www.solar-network.eu/home/ 
23  The few exceptions are e.g Z. Georgieva, ‘The judicial reception of competition soft law in the 
Netherlands and the UK’ (2016) 12 European Competition Journal, 54; Z. Georgieva, ‘Competition soft 
law in French and German courts: A challenge for online sales bans only?’ (2017) 24 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, 175; T. Devine and M. Eliantonio, ‘EU soft law in the hands of national 
authorities: The case study of the UK Competition and Markets Authority’ (2018) 11 Review of European 
Administrative Law, 49. 
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much needed – comparative research on how national courts and authorities apply EU 
soft law. 
 
This research should reveal whether the potential benefits of soft law to induce 
harmonization, to reduce the need for infringement proceedings, to aid national courts 
and authorities in implementing EU law do materialize in practice. 
 
Soft law is praised for many reasons, but it is also criticized heavily for its extreme lack 
of transparency 24  in the adoption procedures, which is claimed to enhance the 
discretion of the EU institutions to the detriment of Member State competences,25 and 
to reduce the role of the European Parliament in EU decision-making.26 Soft law is also 
criticized because it is an instrument which does not seem to ensure proper 
consultation with the stakeholders.27 
 
And what is the problem with that? 
 
That if soft law is indeed producing some legal effects, if it is being used and applied 
by its end-users, if it is, in other words, almost perceived as “law” by them, at the same 
time soft law did not pass through the approval of a legislator, and might therefore be 
considered as by-passing the democratic forms of control. The Guidance Document 
of the European Food Safety Authority which I showed you before, for example, was 
adopted by a European agency without any form of parliamentary control. However, 
what kind of consultation and participation requirements apply to EU soft law, and 
which mechanisms of consultation and participation have been put to practice until 
now has not been coherently studied and should be the object of further investigation. 
 
What are then the “normative demands” of soft law? That national and European 
courts engage with soft law. As held in earlier studies, law should be seen as a 
continuum, varying from non-law through soft law to hard law forms,28 and regulation 
is increasingly hybrid, including both soft and hard law features. 29  In these 
circumstances, it is no longer viable to strictly separate hard law from soft law, as if 
they were two ontologically distinct entities and, as a consequence, it is no longer 
sustainable for courts to refuse to engage with soft law on the grounds that such 
                                                     
24 L. Senden, ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’, (2012) 19 European 
Law Journal, 65. 
25 F. Snyder, ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community’, in S. Martin (Ed.), The 
Construction of Europe (Springer, 1994), 201-203. 
26 Résolution du Parlement européen du 8 mai 1969, sur les actes de la collectivité des États membres 
de la Communauté ainsi que les actes du Conseil non prévus par les traités adoptés à la suite du rapport 
fait au nom de la Commission juridique par M. Burger [1969] OJ C63/18. 
27 R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford University Press, 1997), 284; J. Scott ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-
Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’, (2011) Common Market Law 
Review 48(2), 329-355. 
28 K.W. Abbott and D. Sindal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, (2000) 54 International 
Organization, 421; F. Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union - The Changing Nature of EU Law’, (2015) 
21 European Law Journal, 68. 
29 G. De Búrca and J. Scott, 'Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism', in G. De Búrca 
and J. Scott (Eds.), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); D.M. Trubek 
and L.G. Trubek, 'New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation', 
(2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law, 539. 
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measures do not produce legally binding effects. While European and national courts 
ought, therefore, to embrace hybridity, this ought not to mean a new chance for EU 
institutions to by-pass the basic tenets of the rule of law, including transparency, 
reasons giving and accountability, but acknowledging that soft law is here to stay and 
needs to be both used and controlled by the European and national courts. This 
requires a more streamlined approach to procedural requirements concerning the 
adoption of soft law instruments, which in turn might be of use for the courts when 
engaging with soft law. Discussions on EU soft law have certainly not come to an end. 
 
4. Standardisation 
 
The third and final instrument of wine governance which I would like to present to you 
today is an oenological practice concerning a very special type of wine, dear to many 
sitting in this room today, namely sparkling wine. 30  This practice belongs to the 
International Code of Oenological Practices which is issued by the International Wine 
and Vine Organisation,31 an organization whose principal function is the creation of 
internationally harmonised and accepted standards for the production of vitivinicultural 
products.  
 
This is only one example of how standards are relevant for us. Standards are really 
everywhere, from the toys our children play with, to the way in which companies should 
prepare their accounting books, or test the safety of a medicine, or the safety of the 
lifts in this building, nearly everything is regulated by standards, made by various 
public, private, or hybrid organisations. The employment of standards for regulatory 
purposes is today a key factor in EU policy-making, since it contributes, amongst 
others, to the removal of the technical barriers to trade, and is said to support 
innovation by stimulating dissemination of new technologies. If we consider specifically 
product standards (such as those for toys or for lifts), it could also be added that the 
technical requirements set via these standards aim to deliver safe products on the 
market and, by doing so, to protect health and the environment.32 
 
These standards are developed within organizations of various nature and status, 
outside the legal system of the EU, and often by bodies to which some, but not all, 
Member States may be party. What is striking is that they enter the EU legal system 
and become “EU law” to different extents.  
 
In the case of the wine standards, they are made by an organization to which some 
but not all EU Member States, are party, and, because EU law makes reference to 
                                                     
30  http://www.oiv.org/en/technical-standards-and-documents/oenological-practices/oenological-
practices-sparkling-wines 
31 http://www.oiv.org/en/ 
32 See further Jacques Pelkmans, ‘The New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standardisation’, 
(1987) 25 Journal of Common Market Studies, 249; Michelle Egan, ‘Regulatory Strategies, delegation 
and European market integration’, (1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy, 485; Harm Schepel, The 
Constitution of Private Governance - Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Hart, 
2005). 
 10 
them,33 they become binding EU law. Other standards may become EU soft law, as is 
the case with standards which are created to ensure that certain medicines are safe. 
Other standards, such as those concerning toys and lifts, to come back to the example 
I gave above, are instead in principle not binding, but not using these standards entails 
a lengthy and costly process which most producers do not want to engage with. For 
this reason, one can say that these standards are de facto binding.34 
 
What is the problem with that?  
 
That standards often become binding EU law, or de facto binding for market operators, 
but they have been created by bodies which are outside the EU legal system and do 
not pass function according to the normal forms of parliamentary democratic control. 
Furthermore, because these standards are created by these private or hybrid bodies, 
it is questionable whether the usual public law guarantees apply to them.  
 
Take for example the question of accessibility. Recently, with regards to certain 
standards which are relevant in the EU legal system, the Court of Justice has held that 
they “form part of EU law”.35 Yet, these standards are not freely accessible and the 
standardization bodies who are the authors of these standards hold the copyright on 
them and make them available only against payment. How can we reconcile the idea 
of something being part of EU law and at the same time the fact that they are only 
available against payment? Furthermore, while the EU is committed to openness and 
public participation,36 it is questionable to which extent one can speak of an effective 
stakeholder participation in the standard-making process in light of the economic, 
informational and expertise asymmetries of societal stakeholders (such as those 
representing consumers or environmental concerns) vis-à-vis the industry. More 
empirical research would be necessary to really understand the participatory reality of 
the various standard-making processes at European and global level. Again here I 
plead for a “networked-research” with the many colleagues who, around the globe, try 
understand the operation of standardization processes in various fields, in order to 
unveil the common shortcomings and challenges. 
 
One could say that the dubious legal status of the standard-setting bodies, and the 
even more dubious applicability of public law principles to their activities, makes the 
role of courts all the more important. Recently, at least for certain standards, we can 
observe a growing engagement of European courts, but we still know very little about 
                                                     
33 Article 80(3)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products [2013] OJ L 
347, p. 671–854 
34 This is the case for the so-called New Approach, on which see further Harm Schepel, The Constitution 
of Private Governance. Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Hart Publishing 
2005); J. Falke, ‘Achievements and Unresolved Problems of European Standardization: The Ingenuity of 
Practice and the Queries of Lawyers’, in C. Joerges, K.-H. Ladeur and E. Vos (eds.), Integrating Scientific 
Expertise into Regulatory Decisionmaking- National Traditions and European Innovations (Nomos, 
1997),187; Harm Schepel, ‘The New Approach to the New Approach: The Juridification of Harmonized 
Standards in EU Law’, (2013) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 523. 
35 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited EU:C:2016:821. 
36 Article 1(2) and 10(3) TEU. 
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what is happening at national level. Much more comparative research would be 
needed to see whether and how national courts engage with the various standards 
which are relevant in the EU legal system.  
 
What are then the “normative demands” of standardization?  
 
In all truth, ladies and gentlemen, I am not sure. I am still thinking about this and, if you 
do not mind, I will raise more questions than I will give answers. Because indeed, while 
I pleaded one moment ago for the need for a greater involvement of courts to control 
European and global standards, a very much open question is: against which 
legislative framework should these standards be judged? Should European, or 
perhaps global, principles of administrative law be regarded as the reference? 
 
And to make matters more complicated, would a greater engagement of courts not 
jeopardise the effectiveness of the system, which is based on the active role of those 
being regulated in the creation of the norms which will regulate them? Would a growing 
judicialisation of standardization not threaten the very raison d’être of this form of 
regulation? 
 
And finally, and this is a question which goes well beyond standards and is very much 
at the core of modern regulation, are courts the correct forum to control highly technical 
and complex choices made by experts in the field? While the topic is not new as such, 
and has gained new momentum in European scholarship,37 I think that much more – 
also comparative - research is needed to study the similarities and differences in 
approach of national and European courts towards the review of complex technical 
and scientific decisions to establish possible common trends in the scope and intensity 
of judicial review and whether the requirement of effective judicial protection I 
mentioned before, or the uniform application of EU law, are currently endangered. 
 
5. Conclusions and thanks 
 
Dear ladies and gentlemen, I hope to have shown, with the example of wine, that 
European law, and to some extent also global trends, have been the vector of radical 
changes in regulation. Administrative action is nowadays made through complex 
layers of governance, with hybrid modes of governance, and by non-conventional (and 
only partly public) actors. Where do these developments leave courts? How should 
courts react to these developments?  
 
Traditionally, judicial accountability has been “upward- and backward-looking: the 
court looks upward towards the sovereign and backward toward some prior 
authorization”.38 What if sovereignty is dispersed amongst many layers of governance 
and many different actors? What if the authorization is contained in a “norm” which is 
per se not binding or not even stemming from an “authority”? What is the potential for 
                                                     
37 See e.g. J. Mendes (Ed), EU Executive Discretion and the Limits of the Law (OUP, 2019). 
38 C. Sabel and W. H. Simon, ‘Epilogue: Accountability without Sovereignty’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott 
(Eds.), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006), 398. 
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courts to act as “catalysts” in such situations?39 In other words, how can courts act to 
enhance and facilitate the realization of the goals and principles that are crucial to the 
legitimacy of these complex forms of regulation? I would like to make this the main 
theme of my research agenda. I am lucky enough to have already many colleagues, 
both in Maastricht and elsewhere, who are as passionate as me to discover more about 
the scope and application of the principle of effective judicial protection, of shared and 
transnational administration, of soft law, and of standardization. I hope to be able to 
contribute to make Maastricht, and the Maastricht Center of European Law, a place 
where these phenomena keep on being examined and new ideas are generated. 
 
Dear Madam Rector, dear Mr Dean, dear colleagues, dear friends, dear Paul, cara 
mamma, 
 
I come to point in my inaugural lecture in which I want to thank a number of people 
who have all, in different ways, contributed to me standing here in front of you today.  
 
First of all, I would like to thank the University Board of Maastricht University and the 
Faculty Board of the Faculty of Law for having put their trust in me and appointed me 
for the position which I hold today.  
 
I owe a special word of thank to our Faculty of Law in particular for having made me 
the scholar I am today. I came to Maastricht as a Master student to attend the Magister 
Iuris Communis programme, and I have been so lucky to attend courses by Professors 
such as Jan Smits, Rene de Groot, Aalt-Willem Heringa, Remco van Rhee, Hildegard 
Schneider, Ellen Vos and many more. They have shown a contagious passion for 
comparative law, a shared curiosity to search for the common law of Europe and a 
fearless enthusiasm for turning young students into critical thinkers. I am very proud 
to say that I am a true Maastricht University product, a place where talent, curiosity 
and diversity can thrive. I am honoured to be able to continue my work on the shoulders 
of these giants who have preceded me. 
 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to the Dean of the Law Faculty, Professor Jan Smits, 
and the head of the Department of Public Law, Professor Gerrit van Maanen, for having 
shown an immense and continuous trust in me. I promise to do my best to live up to 
this trust. 
 
A special word of thanks goes to Professor Chris Backes, who has been extremely 
important for my development as a researcher. Dear Chris, I hope to be able to work 
further with you for many years to come. Thank you for all what you have taught me, 
both personally and professionally. 
 
I also want to thank my colleagues at the department of Public Law and at the 
Maastricht Center of European Law, who contribute to lively discussions on European 
                                                     
39 See on this concept, J. Scott and S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance’, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law (2007), 565. 
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and comparative law. I hope to be able to further work on exciting projects with many 
of you in the future. A word of gratitude goes also to the speakers of today’s congress 
for agreeing to be there on this special day. Amongst the friends and colleagues who 
I wish to particularly thank are Natassa Athanasiadou, Sabrina Röttger-Wirtz and 
Annalisa Volpato, for having helped me with the organization of today’s congress, Thu 
Nguyen, for making my Brussels working days extremely enjoyable and having 
accompanied me in the preparations of this day, and Catalina Goanta, for always being 
there to support me. 
 
I also want to thank the many colleagues and friends who have come here to listen to 
this lecture. Thank you for being with me today, for brightening my life and, of course, 
for always being ready to drink a glass of wine (or bubbly!) with me. 
 
At this point, I need to thank four great women, who have all, in different ways, 
contributed to me standing here today in front of all of you. First of all, Professor Rianne 
Letschert, Rector of Maastricht University, for being a role model for many young 
academics. Rianne, your passion, heartfelt enthusiasm and vision is a true inspiration. 
Secondly, Professor Hildegard Schneider, former Dean of the Law Faculty, whose 
generosity, kindness and passion for research and teaching continues to inspire many 
amongst us. Thirdly, Professor Ellen Vos, who has accompanied me since my arrival 
in Maastricht, and have never ceased to believe in me. I am honoured to have your 
trust and your appreciation, Ellen, and I hope that our friendship will last still for many 
years to come. Finally, my mother. Cara mamma, grazie per avermi spinto a dare 
sempre il meglio e grazie per avermi mostrato che ci sono donne che sanno essere, 
allo stesso tempo, compagne, madri e professioniste. I want to thank my mother 
because, as Anne-Marie Slaughter put it in her famous article “Why women still cannot 
have it all”,40 “I owe my own freedoms and opportunities to the pioneering generation 
of women ahead of me”. 
 
Dear Paul, thank you for showing me that, without the shadow of a doubt, French wine 
is better than Italian one. Only joking, Italian wine is better of course. Cher Paul, despite 
our irreconcilable enological and gastronomical differences, I still would like to thank 
you for being, from the beginning, my most enthusiastic supporter. Merci. 
 
The last person I want to thank is my father, who is not here today. I want to thank him 
for being my role model of honesty, integrity, and passion for work. Those who knew 
him know for a fact that, if he is watching us from somewhere today, he is getting rather 
annoyed because he is slowly realizing that he is going to miss a great party. 
 
Dear Madam Rector, dear Mr Dean, dear colleagues, dear friends, dear Paul, cara 
mamma, 
 
I hold one of the chairs which the Dutch Council for Scientific Research has named 
after Johanna Westerdijk, the first female professor in the Netherlands. On some 
                                                     
40 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020/ 
 14 
aspects, Professor Westerdijk and I differ greatly, because I can take now for granted 
what she had to fight for: attend the same conference as my male colleagues, have 
the right to vote or, in fact, be able to have an academic career in the first place. I can 
only hope to be able to reach her academic achievements. However, one thing we 
certainly have in common, and here, ladies and gentlemen we come back to where we 
started: wine. Professor Westerdijk’s motto was “Werken en feesten vormt schoone 
geesten” – working and partying makes happy people. Ladies and gentlemen, the work 
part is done for the day, it is now time for partying. 
 
Ik heb gezegd. 
 
